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Lilia Labidi 
Celibate Women, the Construction of Identity, 
Karama (Dignity), and the “Arab Spring”
https://doi.org/10.3224/gender.v9i1.02
Zusammenfassung
Zölibatär lebende Frauen, die Konstruktion 
von Identität, Karama (Würde) und der „Ara-
bische Frühling“
Untersuchungen über den „Arabischen Früh-
ling“ tendieren dazu, die wirtschaftlichen 
und politischen Bedürfnisse Jugendlicher zu 
fokussieren, adressieren jedoch nicht ihre so-
zialpsychologischen Bedürfnisse, wie etwa 
den unerfüllten Heiratswunsch und dessen 
soziale Konsequenzen. Der Beitrag diskutiert 
den Fall zölibatär lebender Frauen in Tunesi-
en, für die es aufgrund der hohen Jugendar-
beitslosigkeit und daraus folgender Probleme 
schwierig ist, Übergangsrituale zu durchlau-
fen, die sie von der Kindheit ins Erwachse-
nendasein geleiten und ihnen die vollständi-
ge Integration in die Gemeinschaft ermögli-
chen würden. Um in ihrer durch den dikta-
torischen Staat dominierten Lebenswelt den-
noch Selbstkontrolle zu erlangen, haben sie 
für sich eine Form der asketischen Lebens-
führung gewählt, indem sie den hijab tragen, 
den Koran lesen, das tägliche Fasten prakti-
zieren und die hudud neu verhandeln – also 
die moralischen und rechtlichen Grenzen, die 
schon lang Gegenstand breiter Debatten und 
sozialer Reformen sind; gleichzeitig unter-
stützen sie die Frauenrechte, so wie sie in Tu-
nesiens Familienrecht verankert sind. Der Bei-
trag widmet sich besonders dem hierauf be-
zogenen politischen Diskurs im ‚Arabischen 
Frühling‘ seit 2011 und dem Bemühen, eine 
„moralische Persönlichkeit“ zu entwickeln. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Tunesien, enthaltsame Frauen, Rituale, „Ara-
bischer Frühling“, Nahdha
Summary
Studies of the “Arab Spring” have tended to 
focus on the economic and political needs of 
youth, but have not addressed socio-psycho-
logical needs such as an unfulfilled desire for 
marriage and its social consequences. This ar-
ticle discusses the case of celibate women in 
Tunisia who, because of the high rate of 
youth unemployment and its social conse-
quences, find it difficult to accomplish the 
rites of passage that would take them from 
childhood to adulthood and allow full inte-
gration into the community. In order to gain 
control over the self in a social context that 
was dominated by a dictatorial state, they 
have chosen a form of asceticism, wearing 
the hijab, reading the Qur’an, practicing daily 
fasting, and re-negotiating hudud – that is 
moral boundaries and legal limits that have 
long been a subject of wide debate and of so-
cial reforms; at the same time, they support 
women’s rights as expressed in Tunisia’s Per-
sonal Status Code. Particular attention is paid 
in this article to the political discourse after 
2011 and efforts to construct a “moral per-
sonality.”
Keywords 
Tunisia, celibate women, rituals, “Arab 
Spring”, Nahdha
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1 Introduction
Starting in Tunisia in December 2010 the Arab world began to experience political 
upheavals that have shaken the entire region and the wider world ever since. In Tunisia, 
this upheaval, often labeled as “Arab Spring”, was largely led by youth. Numerous 
analyses have focused on the motives for their rebellion in a country that was cited by 
the World Bank and the IMF as a model in achieving economic success, and which 
ex plained the “revolution” of December 2010/January 2011 that led to the fall of the 
Ben Ali regime as motivated by political factors such as the totalitarian system, the 
police state, corruption, etc. Rarely did these analyses take into account the uncon­
scious  motives in the youth’s behavior. In this article I want to throw some light on the 
 demands made by youth from an anthropological and psychoanalytic perspective; this 
may help us understand the significance of the revolution’s slogans such as Shugul, 
Hurriya, Karama (Work, Freedom, Dignity) or Shughul, Hurriya, Karama Wataniyya 
(Work, Freedom, National Dignity) (Ammar 2013).1
To contextualize these slogans chanted during the December 2010/January 2011 
period, we must keep in mind that the region has experienced very significant trans­
formations over the past decades leading to a renegotiation of gender relations. These 
transformations include the fact that the population between 15 and 29 years of age has 
grown by 50 percent and those under 25 years of age constitute between one and two 
thirds of the population, with one quarter of youth in universities throughout the region. 
Tunisia, in particular, among other shifts, has also seen an improvement in health indica­
tors, a lowering of maternal and infant mortality, and life expectancy now over 70 years 
for men and women. On the other hand, the unemployment rate in Tunisia increased 
from 2.3 percent in 1984 to 3.8 percent in 1994, reaching 10.2 percent in 2004. By 2008, 
this rate had doubled to 21.8 percent, with women university graduates, especially those 
living in rural areas, having twice the unemployment rate of men (Institut National de 
Statistiques 1999, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).
Unemployment in the region led to significant emigration of men from rural areas 
to the coastal cities, and from Tunisia to Libya and the countries north of the Medi­
terranean. It has also led to the phenomenon of involuntary celibacy – something the 
region never experienced in the past. The proportion of unmarried women went from 
17.7 percent in 2001 to 37.5 percent in 2006, with a 50 percent rate of celibacy among 
men in similar age groups (Ben Amor 2009). Because of a lack of economic means and 
an understanding of sexuality conceived within the framework of Islamic ethics, young 
people are unable to carry out certain rites. A study in a number of Muslim countries 
carried out by the Pew Research Center (2013) examined views on religion and its im­
1 This paper uses material from about a dozen unstructured interviews with celibate women from 
different economic, geographic, educational, and social backgrounds, carried out in Tunis in 
2009/2010. These women are now living in urban settings, but maintain contact with their regions 
of origin. Often they have a sister or brother working abroad, in Europe or in the Gulf countries. 
The cultural impact of the Gulf countries is visible in the dress worn for family celebrations as well 
as on other occasions. In addition, this group of women belongs to the generation that grew up 
with satellite television and regularly follows religious programs coming from the Gulf.
 Some sections of this paper were written when I was a member of the Visiting Scholars Program 
at the Council on Middle East Studies, Yale University, 2009/2010.
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pact on politics, morality, etc. and shows that, after the uprising, 89 percent of Tunisians 
considered sexual relations outside marriage to be immoral. 
The combination of these aspects – improvement of some indicators yet a growing 
lack of control over one’s life – strengthened feelings of discontent, often accompanied 
by strong feelings of failure, feelings that found expression in slogans such as Shugul, 
Hurriya, Karama (Work, Dignity, Freedom) that were chanted during demonstrations 
taking place after 26­year­old Mohamed Bouazizi’s desperate step of self­immolation in 
December 2010 – a gesture that many youths saw as reflecting their own despair. This 
combination has had a crucial impact on notions of identity. I will try to show here how 
aspects of identity construction are tied to cultural forms, to the political context, and to 
new societal demands that push for a renegotiation of hudud: the moral boundaries and 
legal limits that have long been the object of a wide debate in Tunisia and in the Arab 
world at large and where changing interpretations have gone along with reforms and 
significant changes in public and private life. 
In the first part of this discussion I will show how the identity of men and women 
is constructed in Tunisian society and culture using the concept of the “moral personal­
ity” and how the impossibility of realizing one’s goals on the social level affects this 
construction, leading to the concerns that youth expressed during the “Arab Spring” in 
their demand for karama (personal dignity). In the second section, I will discuss the role 
that sexuality played in new social movements before 2011 and how youth were using 
the internet to give visibility to their demands. I will also look at the appeals made by 
Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the moderate Islamic political party Nahdha who, since 
his return from exile in 2011, called upon young men to marry and not be captive to the 
traditional model of the appropriate spouse (virginity, youth, not divorced, etc.), and we 
will see how these appeals were received by the civil society. In the third section, I will 
show how women who are no longer adolescents, who remain unmarried not by choice, 
also demand karama, and how they define karama as a way to emphasize the will of the 
individual to dominate (sexual) desires in order to gain control over the self. In this, they 
are strategically choosing a life­style similar to asceticism, a term I am using to refer to 
a set of religious and moral attitudes.
2 The Construction of Identity 
In the following, I will show how rites play a fundamental role in many areas of social 
and cultural life: in constructing the societal imaginary for both women and for men; 
in constructing a “moral personality”2; and in the ways the construction of identity ar­
2 This notion of “moral personality” follows Immanuel Kant’s view, as articulated by William A. 
Galston, who writes: “Kant’s account of moral personality allows us to speak of the dignity and 
inviolability of every individual and to understand individuals as bearers of rights, simply by virtue 
of their humanity. Kantian moral theory provides a philosophical foundation for the derivation of 
legitimate authority and rational principles of social organization from freedom, equality, and au-
tonomous consent – the predominant values of our democratic age” (Galston 1982: 493). Fouad 
M. Moughrabi was also concerned with the concept of the moral personality. He noted that Arab 
researchers trained in the West did not only use studies carried out by Western researchers in the 
context of the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war against Israel, but that they were also irritated 
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ticulates with the notion of karama. In such constructions marriage constitutes an im­
portant aspect of moral identity in a society in which a worthy individual is someone 
who respects him­/herself (yikram nafsahu/ha), keeping oneself distant from trouble and 
disorder. The notion of karama takes on, with the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad, his words and actions, etc.) a particular meaning where marrying means 
fulfilling “half of one’s religion”. A second aspect of submission to the symbolic order 
in this regard is the mother’s success in separating herself from her son, and the father’s 
success in recognizing the limits of his power.
I will also show how the situation of unmarried youths leads to the emergence of 
groups of well­educated men and women whose celibacy is not a result of their deliber­
ate choice which calls our attention, as Bourdieu suggests, not so much to the contrast 
between the initiated and the uninitiated, but to those who are unable to practice these 
rites (Bourdieu/Thompson 1991: 117–118). The unmarried, the “unitiated”, are those 
who do not fulfil their sexual urges in a way recommended by Islam to its followers, 
where marriage elevates the value of prayers: for example, a hadith that the Prophet 
said: “Two rak’at (prayer movements) prayed by a married person are better than the 
night­vigil and the fast of a single person.” This echoes a view that the unmarried are 
placed on society’s margins.
In recalling this moral framework of sexuality, we understand better the urgent 
demand for karama in the context of the “Arab Spring” and the intensity of despair 
among youth. This will push us to explore, at a first stage, the articulations among 
different rites of passage – some that are secular and some that, in a few cases, have 
a religious dimension that reinforces its meaning, suggesting an underlying unity that 
Westermarck, who spent considerable time describing some rituals in the region, did not 
address ( Westermarck 1968). 
The articulation among the different rites will allow us to see the construction of 
what I call “moral personality”. The relational system that appears shows us how, via 
these rites, we witness a controlled regression concerning what psychoanalysts call 
prim ary traumatisms. And we also see how the obligatory public representations of cer­
tain rites lead to a demarcation between the conscious and the unconscious, to submis­
sion to the symbolic order and the principles of justice. 
I will show, via an analysis of personal rituals taking place in public and encompas­
sing both secular and religious phenomena, how the succession of these rituals over the 
course of a person’s life contributes to the construction of men’s and women’s identity, 
to masculinity/femininity. The rituals on these occasions have a similar structure for 
males and for females, rather than the masculine model serving as a basis for discussion 
of the feminine model, as is the case for Freudian theory (Freud 1923). Here, I will use 
Winnicott’s definition of religious ritual to draw a parallel with the play of children in 
the pre­oedipal and oedipal stages of development. For children under six years of age, 
not only is play a healthy realm of make­believe, but the make­believe is felt to be real, 
which can help us understand how the ritual of okssa (which, as we will see later, puts 
a woman’s hair in ponytail form, signifying restraint and control) is actualized and rein­
by the weaknesses that plagued their respective societies and exaggerated their criticisms with 
the hope that their appeals might motivate leaders to act more quickly in bringing about needed 
reforms (Moughrabi 1978: 109).
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terpreted (for Winnicot’s views, see Merkur 1991: 23). We will also see how the model 
of “moral personality” suggests another reading of psychological development which 
integrates the stages of psycho­sexual development in the Freudian model (oral, anal, 
phallic, period of latency, genital stages) with Erikson’s eight stages of psychosocial 
development, while remaining more complex.3 
These rituals convey a conscious symbolism where the idea of chaos is not derived 
from the external reality of nature but is instead based on the internal reality of the 
unconscious (Merkur 1991: 16–17). We will see how certain rituals, such as the public 
rituals of circumcision for boys and al-Ijbar for girls, and the private rituals of r’bat 
for the son and okssa and tasfih for the daughter, while not performed at the same age 
for males and females, treat the connection between separation­return­continuity as the 
foundation of morality. This model of “moral personality” will also help us to under­
stand those whom Pierre Bourdieu labels the “uninitiated” (Bourdieu/Thompson 1991: 
117–118), and why cases like remaining unmarried, being sterile, and the death of a boy 
before marrying, are viewed as disturbing the social order.
I would also like to draw attention to the fact that in this article I use terms and con­
cepts employed by members of the society being discussed, and these are used to show 
the importance of their articulation in the societal imaginary. In other societies other 
terms would be used – in Europe, for example, discussions might involve terms such as 
subjectivity and/or autonomy. 
2.1  Rituals and the Internal Reality of the Unconscious 
Via an analysis of some rites of passage taking place in public and encompassing both 
secular and religious phenomena, we will see how the succession of some rituals over 
the course of a person’s life contributes to the construction of men’s and women’s iden­
tity, to masculinity and femininity.4
Stage 1: Birth – Infancy.
The birth of a male infant is marked by an important ceremony taking place on the 
seventh day after birth, when the infant is given a name and when a ritual is per formed 
showing the symbolic defense of the family’s possessions, symbolizing the infant’s 
struggle to claim a place within his lineage. The son, up until his circumcision, will be 
raised among women.
The arrival of a girl is celebrated as for the son, but with fear that the daughter will 
lose her virginity before marriage.
3 Erikson’s stages are: trust vs. mistrust; autonomy vs. shame and doubt; initiative vs. guilt; industry 
vs. inferiority; identity vs. role confusion; intimacy vs. isolation; generativity vs. stagnation; ego 
integrity vs. despair (Erikson 1993: 247–273).
4 The circumcision ceremony for boys continues to be practiced throughout the Maghreb, in both 
rural and urban areas, often with music and a significant audience, depending on the socio-
economic level of the family. The internet provides opportunities to see these ceremonies and the 
number of visits these sites receive shows the high level of interest for these ceremonies. In Europe, 
among populations of Maghreb origin, although the circumcision itself takes place in a clinic, the 
ceremony is often carried out upon the family’s return to their homeland.
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Stage 2: Circumcision of Boys: Resolution of the Oedipus Complex – Good/Evil 
2a.  Khitan (circumcision), usually taking place at the age of 4 to 6 as a public ritual, 
when the child is supposed to be capable of distinguishing good from evil, is called 
the “little marriage” or “opening the door”. It is roughly at this age that Freud situ­
ates the resolution of the Oedipus complex. The khitan can only take place with the 
agreement of the mother – if she postpones this too long, say until the son is 8 or 9 
years old, the men will steal the boy (even men from outside the family may do this) 
and have the circumcision performed. 
2b.  Here, propitiatory rites (i.e., rites that ask for something, like protection) show 
how difficult the separation is for both son and mother, and particularly for the 
 mother. The preparations concern mother and son (the women of the family go to 
the  hammam (public bath), their feet and hands are painted with henna, and both 
mother and son wear new clothes for this occasion), symbolizing rebirth in a new 
state and attracting the community’s attention. 
2c.  With pomp and ceremony, on the circumcision day the mother and son lead the as­
semblage, followed by relatives and neighbors, and the men follow after. Reaching 
the boundary of the village or neighborhood, the women congratulate the mother, 
and then the father, son, and men take the leading position of the assemblage, with 
the women going back to where the men were. 
2d.  During her son’s circumcision, the mother publicly displays her suffering: her hair 
wildly scattered on her head, she holds a mirror in one hand and, with the other, 
holds a coin to her forehead. While doing this, she is seated and her feet are in a 
basin of water where a piece of metal has been placed so that her feet and her spirit 
remain cool as she endures her son’s pain and does not run to save him from the 
operation. 
2e.  Several days after the circumcision, the barber/or male nurse who has performed 
the operation brings back to the mother the skin that has been removed during the 
operation, and the mother will then pay him for the operation.
Stage 3: Pre-Adolescence/Celibacy
After his circumcision the son will be mainly among the male family members and will 
have the symbolic status of head of household when the father/older siblings are absent. 
For the daughter the following rites are performed on the private level:
3a.  The okssa ceremony: with her hair tied in a ponytail held by a ribbon, as a metaphor 
for modesty, this is a simple ceremony bringing together only women who are close 
to the girl.
3b.  The tasfih ceremony: this ritual is performed by an old woman who makes seven 
scars on one knee of the young girl, with the blood wiped away with dried grapes 
and the following phrase pronounced by the girl, “I am a wall, he is a thread”, meant 
to protect the young girl from any sexual relationship.
3c.  In case of rape, where sexual relations are viewed as illegitimate by the community, 
the girl receives diya (compensation for an injury or a killing) equivalent to the 
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mahr (compensation for the loss of virginity) as is determined by her social rank, 
to be paid by the rapist or, if he is unable to do so, by the community or the state. 
Since independence, the rapist is obliged to marry his victim and cannot divorce for 
two years; if he refuses he must serve a prison term. Today, although the law has 
not changed, judges with increasing frequency sentence the rapist to a prison term, 
saying that marriage will take place only after release.5
Stage 4: Marriage
This involves legal and public recognition of a relationship that will lead to legitimate 
offspring; the public nature of this is termed al-Ichhar. The following rites for men are 
private, except the first one, which is a public rite:
4.1a  The groom will pay the mahr to his future wife. 
4.1b  The return of the son to his mother and recognition of his dependency on the moth­
er: whereas the man’s sexuality has been uncontrolled during the period between 
circumcision and marriage – Hichem Djaït speaks of elastic sexuality before mar­
riage (referring mainly to homosexuality6) – he is now placed, symbolically, under 
the mother’s control. Three days before the marriage, the mother secretly performs 
the r’bat, that is, she puts knots on a string that she places on her son’s back.
4.1c  During the three days before the ceremony, the groom is accompanied by his 
“min isters”, who stay close to him during this transitional period at the end of 
which, the mother untying the r’bat, the son is liberated.
4.1d  The family anxiously awaits confirmation of the sexual potency of the groom. An 
Iranian miniature from the 14th century (1396) painted by Janayd shows a marriage 
where those in attendance display the blood-stained sheet and make offerings to 
the groom, while the deflowered bride cries.
Rites for women: the following rites for women are public:
4.2a  The marriage cannot take place without the father’s agreement. The bride re ceives 
payment of the mahr from the future spouse, which can be paid in two parts: 
mou’ajil, the expenses for the ceremony, paid before the ceremony takes place, 
5 From 2011 on, feminists have been very active in Tunisia and Morocco to eliminate Law 227bis and 
Law 475 of their respective penal codes, which allow a rapist to escape a prison term by marrying 
his victim. In Morocco the suicide of Amina Filali following her marriage to the man who had raped 
her – a marriage imposed on her by her family – sparked a mobilization in civil society, including 
artists who used installations, photography, documentary films, etc. – which led to changes in the 
law in 2014. In Tunisia, the case brought by “Mériem” in 2012 against two policemen whom she 
accused of raping her while they were on duty, led to civil society mobilization against the rape of 
women. Further, the marriage in the region of Kef in 2016 of a 13-year-old girl to the 21-year-old 
unemployed brother of her brother-in-law, who had made her pregnant – a marriage author ized 
by a judge – also mobilized civil society and social media, with demonstrations in front of parlia-
ment against allowing rapists to escape prison by marrying their victims who were below the legal 
marriage age. In this case the judiciary annulled the marriage and the law was later repealed (see 
Zouari 2016).
6 The Tunisian historian Hichem Djaït uses the concept of elastic sexuality (1974).
2_Gender1-17_SP_Labidi_011-029.indd   17 23.02.2017   17:33:37
18 Lilia Labidi 
GENDER 1 | 2017
and mou’akhar, a sum that is the woman’s exclusive property, to be paid on the 
date indicated on the marriage contract. If the mou’akhar (the second part of the 
mahr payment) is not paid on the agreed date, sexual relations are prohibited be­
tween the married couple.
4.2b  The outia ceremony: three days before the marriage ceremony the mother, in pub­
lic, partially cuts the bride’s hair, saying that this is to distance her from how she 
was spoiled in her father’s house (anxiety, questioning of sexuality, etc.), and the 
groom’s family brings jewelry to her as compensation. 
4.2c  The young woman proceeds to the jalwa ritual. Dressed in beautiful clothes, the 
bride raises her open hands to her shoulders, palms facing forward, as a sign of 
peace, and turns around in a full circle.
4.2d  In the presence of women of the family only, the undoing of the tasfih (stage 3b) 
takes place: here, the performance is reversed without scarification – and the girl 
will say the opposite of the tasfih sentence: “I am a thread, he is a wall”. 
4.2e  Ijbar: on the day of the marriage, the father presents his daughter and publicly puts 
his hand on her head, as a sign of ijbar, obliging her to renounce her fantasies. 
4.2f  The family awaits confirmation of virginity, the showing of blood on the sheet 
from the marriage bed.7 In the presence of virginity, the day following the marriage 
and for the seven days following, the groom is taken away from the bride from 
morning, when the bride’s aggression is the strongest as a result of her experience 
of deflowering, until evening, when her aggression has diminished and she is ea­
ger for her husband’s return. In the absence of virginity, the groom will usually 
annul the marriage and, in extreme cases, the bride’s father/brother murders the 
bride (“honor crime” which had become very rare by the 1990s and which, since 
then, is a criminal act under Tunisian legislation).  
Stage 5: Adult Stage
5a.  In cases of sterility, there is a private ritual for women on the occasion of Ashura, 
the celebration of the dead, which suggests the status of a woman unable to have 
children is similar to that of a dead person.
5b.  The arrival of a daughter is an affliction for the father. The mother is saved from 
sterility but is afflicted for not having a boy. 
5c.  With the arrival of a son, the father is honored. The mother is liberated from her 
lower status and attains a status of “mother of a son”. Proverbs and songs that were 
used throughout the country into the 1980s and that are still heard today in rural and 
poor urban areas (Labidi 1989) testify to the importance of the newborn boy for the 
mother. 
7 While still practiced on occasion in rural areas, showing the blood-stained sheet is no longer seen 
among the Tunisian middle class, with the just-married couple usually spending their first days in a 
hotel or on a honeymoon voyage. See Labidi (2007), Labidi (2008).
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Stage 6: Submission to the Symbolic Order – Becoming a Full Member of the Community 
For the father, in urban as in rural areas, the ritual sacrifice of a ram is mandatory for 
each head of household once a year on the day of the Aid al-Adha/al-Kbir8. 
6.1a  Before the Aid, children decorate the ram and feed it, clean it and play with it in 
the neighborhood that is the child identifies with the ram. The ram is explicitly 
substituted for Ismail (God called upon Abraham to sacrifice his son Isma’il), and 
the process of substitution in sacrifice, as a symbolic transaction, displaces and 
conceals violence. 
6.2a  This ritual, whose form is very important, points to the father’s submission to the 
symbolic order. For the mother, it is through accepting the circumcision of her son 
(see stage 2) that she becomes a full member of the community and demonstrates 
that she is not a phallic dominating mother. 
6.1b  This ritual points to the mother’s submission to the symbolic order as she attains 
the status of a full member of the community and the son is saved from psychosis, 
accedes to culture, science, religion, etc. 
6.2b  If the son dies before his marriage, the funerary rites are explicit in specifying the 
“not good enough mother” – the phallic mother, in the social imaginary.
2.2  Conception of the Self
We have seen how the rituals are connected to one another and how each stage is re­
lated to the preceding and the subsequent one. Here, the rituals convey two elements. 
First, there is a conscious symbolism where the idea of chaos does not derive from the 
external reality of nature but is instead based on the internal reality of the unconscious 
(Merkur 1991: 16–17). Noureddine Toualbi shows, in Algeria, that when a boy’s cir­
cumcision is practiced without ritual in the hospital, this increases the child’s trauma as 
it decreases the event’s social significance by abandoning the traditional ceremony that 
surrounds it (Toualbi 1975; Chebel 1993). Here, the ritual is consistent with the concept 
of play discussed by Winnicott, where we saw in the case of circumcision how the entire 
ritual is a performance and provides for a “healthy” separation from the mother. The 
success of this ritual also presupposes “a good mother” which means in Winnicott’s 
terminology a mother identifying with her child’s needs to separate from the mother and 
then to return to her, to see her in a new light. In Tunisian speech this rite is called halan 
el-bab (opening the door) or le petit marriage (the little wedding).
The second element is the role played by representation in these rites. Certain rit­
uals, such as the public rituals of circumcision for boys and al-Ijbar for girls have an 
unconscious function. Others like the private rituals of r’bat for the future husband 
and the okssa and the tasfih for the daughter, as well as their reversals, have conscious 
functions, and treat separation­return­continuity as the foundation of the “moral person­
ality”. In these circumstances, the rites that relate to the separation of the child from the 
parent of the opposite sex, boy from mother, girl from father, enable the boy as well as 
the girl to construct the self in a stable manner. If the mother is unsuccessful, for ex­
8 Aid al-Adha or al-Kbir is the Sacrifice Feast to commemorate the willingness of Ibrahim/Abraham 
to follow God’s command to sacrifice his son Isma’il/Ishmael.
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ample, in carrying out the circumcision of her son, or is psychologically absent or too 
dominating, clinical evidence shows us that the boy runs the risk of depression and/or 
other psychological problems (Toualbi 1975; Ben Chehida 1995). The “good­enough 
mother” as described by Winnicott is the mother who, in the case of circumcision, shows 
herself as an ideal mother through performing the required rites, i.e., is attentive to all 
forms of dialogue, of creative play. She shows herself capable of inspiring in the child 
the frustration that is necessary for him/her to develop desire and the capacity for indi­
viduation. The “good­enough father” plays a similar role with regard to the daughter in 
the case of ijbar. The final element is that these rituals have a similar structure for both 
sexes, rather than one serving as the model for the other.
This structure, which we are calling the “moral personality”, corresponds to a si­
gnificant extent to the stages of Sufi self-development and integrates the stages of psy­
cho­sexual development in the Freudian model with the psycho­social stages of Erik 
Erikson, even while going beyond them. We find in each of these rites of passage stages 
(preliminary, liminal, postliminal), as they have been described by Arnold van Gennep 
(1960) and developed further by Victor Turner (1969, 2001) and see how these ceremo­
nies, operationalizing the structure of the “moral personality”, allow youths to structure 
their lives in stages, providing a satisfying conception of the self and a relationship to 
the group. 
All of this helps to identify that the slogans in evidence during the “Arab Spring” 
in Tunisia had precursors during the first decade of the 2000s; at this time there were al-
ready signs that we were witnessing a new kind of social movement in the region, which 
a number of writers noticed and described in works that were precursors of the “Arab 
Spring”, e.g. Basma Kodmani (2011).
In the next part of this discussion we will see how active movements, other forms of 
expression, and life­style strategies among unmarried youth appear to be gaining force 
in various Arab countries to protest against the celibacy affecting both men and women. 
This situation of celibacy, a new one for the region, focused the attention of researchers 
and politicians, who called for taking into account the habitus of youth which needs to 
be seen as a major contributing element to the stability of a country (e.g.  Hegazy 2007).
3 Involuntary Celibacy and Sexuality
Whereas the states of the Arab world may see involuntary celibacy of youth as a way 
to reduce the birth rate, they also see it as a threat to national and international security, 
a perception reinforced by clandestine emigration and the participation of Tunisians in 
jihad in Libya, in Iraq, and in Syria since January 2011. 
3.1  The Internet, Sexuality, and New Types of Social Movements 
Among the main obstacles to marriage for a youthful population throughout the region 
are the costs of the wedding, unemployment, and the price of housing. This has led to an 
increased use of the internet by youth and, while states feared the effects of the internet 
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on the political level, we see that, before January 2011, the internet was providing a 
forum for expression to social movements of a very different sort. 
In Morocco, the internet has promoted marriages between Moroccan women and 
foreign men from a variety of countries (18 nationalities in all, including Europeans), 
with the number of such marriages increasing from about 1,000 in 1997 to about 6,000 
in 2007 (Labidi 2010; also Laaroussi 2010 who mentions several cases of marriage be­
tween Moroccan women and Quebec men who met via the internet). In Egypt, a number 
of different activities testify to this new development. Blogs written by women and 
treating their celibacy have been noticed by publishers.9 As a symptom of the situation, 
the announcement of the second marriage of Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif at 
the age of 57, after the death of his first wife following a long sickness, led to public 
criticism, with unmarried adults denouncing disparity in the social system and creating 
a Facebook page entitled “Why Nazif gets married while we can’t”. Following an ex­
ample that occurred two years earlier in Saudi Arabia, young Egyptian men appealed 
via Facebook – an appeal that quickly gained thousands of participants – for a strike in 
March 2010 against making any further progress on the road to marriage, with the aim 
of pushing families to reduce the cost of marriage for young people.   
In Tunisia, a number of studies show that the dominant desire among youth was to 
emigrate, to the extent that the authorities refused to make some of these studies public. 
In addition, until the uprising in 2010/2011, the internet in Tunisia was heavily censored 
and was not a forum as popular as it was in Egypt and Morocco; its use among youth 
became widespread only following the uprising. 
We should mention here that the increased wearing of the hijab during the 1990s 
did not stop women who wore it, as with Tunisian women in general, from using contra­
ception and/or abortion, enabling them to have fewer children and exercise control over 
their bodies, a central feminist demand, and to seek judicial recourse when their rights 
were violated. In 2009, the average number of children per woman had decreased to two 
(versus nine in 1956).
Wearing the hijab in the 2000s is being experienced and interpreted in a variety of 
ways. In Tunisia, girls often wear the hijab against the will of their parents (for whom 
it may signify a form of social regression), and see it as signifying a struggle against 
sexism and anarchy, an element for liberation. Several studies carried out in the region 
mention that, for women, the hijab is viewed as a protection against feelings of naked­
ness, against impurity, as providing an alternative to the isolation of being restricted to 
the home, and as asserting the sexual ethics required of their gender in the Muslim order 
(Hessina 1994; Mahmood 2011; Deeb 2006; Winegar 2002, especially 153–154).
Also, some see the hijab as increasing a woman’s mobility, providing physical and 
emotional security, and serving the paradoxical purpose of challenging and underscoring 
the notion of the unchanging, eternal female and her associated traditional roles. Mervat 
Nasser (1999) advances a psychological interpretation suggesting that women in Egypt 
wear the hijab because they need to find solutions to new pressures placed upon them 
9 In 2008, the publisher Al-Chourouq published the chronicle, Ayza atgawes (I want to get married) 
from a blog written by Ghada Abdel-Al and Orz bi-laban li chakhsein (Rice with milk for two) by 
Rehab Bassam. Both started their blogs in 2004. Abdel-Al’s case will be discussed later in this pa-
per.
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globally, including conflicting cultural messages and contradictory cultural expecta-
tions; and it is also a sign of women’s pursuit of self-definition, development and power 
negotiations, within the progressive differentiation of a society undergoing change. 
After the hijab began to be worn as a statement of self-affirmation vis-a-vis parents 
or employers, we see, in the context of state feminist practices, that with the marriage 
crisis, two main strategies emerge among women wearing the hijab. For some wearing 
the hijab is a response to men’s preference for marriage with women who, in addition to 
their modesty, show the outward signs of it as well (Hawkins 2008). For others, wearing 
the hijab and fasting outside the month of Ramadan in order to preserve their dignity 
(karama), is a way to control their impulses and behavior, similar to Islamic recom­
mendations for men who do not have the means to marry. This situation mostly affects 
women who spent a number of years in higher education, women who after university 
education remain unemployed and working­class women who are unwilling to marry 
someone without employment. A majority of these women, in the context of a police 
state where Islamists were a target of repression, were not engaged in political, feminist, 
or trade union activities. 
Among the Tunisian women I interviewed belonging to this last group was 31­year­
old Fatma (a pseudonym) from Tozeur, a southern Tunisian town. She has been living in 
Tunis since 1998, where she studied medicine. Her parents are teachers and she is one 
of four children, two boys and two girls. Her maternal uncle is a doctor and practices in 
Tozeur. After her medical studies she specialized in occupational medicine. Unmarried, 
she lives with a group of other unmarried women, wears the hijab, prays regularly, 
reads the Qur’an either alone or with a group and, since 2004, regularly fasts outside the 
month of Ramadan. 
Her relations with her colleagues are difficult, for they reproach her assiduousness. 
“If I simply work more than they do, problems arise with my colleagues. There is also the question of 
different socio-economic levels. And then, if you don’t dress like the others problems arise with the 
senior personnel (...). Today, medicine is a difficult field if you don’t belong to a powerful family circle.” 
After successful completion of her residency she chose a specialty she thought would 
expose her less to the ethical conflicts arising in contact with hospitalized patients. 
“I experienced a number of disappointments during my internship and I discovered things that didn’t 
conform to my medical ideals. On the one hand there are the constraints the institutional hierarchy 
places upon the practice of medicine in the hospitals and, on the other hand, there are the conditions 
that patients are subjected to (...). Now, having chosen occupational medicine, I no longer have to 
shoulder the same responsibilities a doctor faces. As an intern, I was thinking about the patients, about 
their treatment, even after I left the hospital (...)”. 
She concludes by saying that she wants to go work in “the Gulf countries, because med­
icine in Tunisia is no longer what it used to be.” 
Although wearing the hijab makes her the target of reprimands from the hospital 
and university administrations, she keeps wearing it, even while adjusting it “according 
to administrative whims that required that the hijab allow the hair to be seen. As for 
dress, that was easier because I wear trousers with a blouse or vest that reaches to the 
knees, in order to avoid problems.” 
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Fatma began to fast regularly in 2004, a period that was marked by her feelings 
of solitude, a difficult socio-economic context, and widespread discontent among the 
population. After being unsuccessful in the competition for a residency and suffering a 
loss of morale when she experienced unemployment after her medical internship, she 
says she found solace only in the religious programs on the Islamic television channel 
Iqra and in fasting. 
“Living alone, I fast without limit, it doesn’t disturb me at all. I fast on the days that are recommended 
for the fast and the ten days of the Hajj, for when you fast you have an ‘Ajir’ (a good deed) that opens 
for you the doors of Paradise, called Bab al-Rayyan (the gate through which a person who fasts enters 
Heaven on the Day of Judgment). Also, when I don’t feel anything while listening to the Qur’an, then I 
fast in order to be closer to God. When I’m thinking only of life, of worldly goods, then I fast (...). And 
when I fast I forget myself, I think only of others, of the poor, and I feel closer to God. No one knows 
that I fast. I don’t speak about it, so that I won’t lessen its effect. As an unmarried person, I can fast as 
much as I want.”
Before the “Arab Spring” began, state responses to growing celibacy varied according 
to the means at their disposal and the cultural context. In Iran, temporary marriage was 
raised as a solution to the psychological problems of youth and for poor people, and 
some states in the Gulf countries have chosen to set up funds to support marriages. The 
Tunisian Ministry for Women, the Family, Childhood, and the Aged, confronting figures 
showing the high percentage of unmarried women, distributed announcements over a 
number of years encouraging marriage, but this had no perceptible effect. 
In some countries, NGOs organized collective marriages. While collective mar­
riages within families, sometimes of modest means, often take place, what is new is 
that, contrary to the general trend of the individualization of such practices since in­
dependence, these societies now seem to be returning to collective marriage ceremo­
nies to counter the celibacy crisis in the region, ceremonies that may be organized by 
government institutions, by civil society, and/or by political parties. In Tunisia before 
2011, information concerning collective marriages was only briefly mentioned by the 
media, often without naming the organizers, although the political leadership’s approval 
was required given the size and locale of the event. After 2011, marriages organized by 
the Al-Afef association, close to the Nahdha political party, used locales such as sports 
stadia, swimming pools, hippodromes, and took place in the presence of officers of this 
party and were often well­publicized events. The collective marriage that took place in 
2012 in Ezzahra (a suburb of Tunis) was telecast by Al-Jazeera.
Tunisian families, during the month of Ramadan 2010 – a unique period during the 
year when families watch televised serials produced specifically for this occasion – dis­
covered the series Ayza Atgawez (“I want to get married”), taken from the blog written 
by Ghada Abdel­Al which was a great success in 2004 and was later published as a book 
in 2008 by the Egyptian publisher Al-Chourouq. The story treats the difficulties a young 
woman pharmacist working in a public hospital has in finding a husband, and the book 
was translated into several languages. The televised serial was very popular in Tunisia, 
representing an experience that was very widespread and many Tunisians could easily 
empathize with the personage of the young pharmacist, played by the Tunisian actress 
Hind Sabri (she also produced the series), who faced problems common to many young 
unmarried Tunisian women.
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When the Minister for Women’s Affairs in the Hamadi Jebali government Sihem 
Badi, who had lived in France for almost two decades before her appointment, declared 
in 2012 that orfi marriage was a case of individual freedom, this led to much criticism 
from secularist women, feminists, and independent women researchers, and she was 
obliged to retract.10 
3.2  The Response of the Nahdha Political Party to Women’s Demands 
after January 2011
In May 2012, Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Nahdha party, who had returned to 
Tunisia in 2011 after more than two decades in exile in Great Britain, addressed issues 
relating to the family. He stated that the party recognized the Personal Status Code and 
what had been already achieved for Tunisian women, and that the Nahdha party had 
voted for political parity for women in 2011, which allowed 49 women to enter the Tu­
nisian Constituent Assembly in 2011, among them 42 members of the Nahdha party. He 
also reassured women by saying that the Islamic model of the family was monogamous 
and that polygamy had been authorized only to solve certain social problems particular 
to periods of war. In this context, he expressed his pain at seeing young people turning 
away from marriage and called for solutions to the problems of unemployment, solu­
tions that would make it possible for most youth to marry. 
I should mention that since Nahdha party members returned from exile, mar riages 
of the party leaders’ children have been given significant media attention. Several 
months after their return the association Al-Afef (Purity), which is close to the Nahdha 
party and looking to support marriage for those who wished to marry but were in diffi­
cult  economic situations (some were more than 40 years old and/or had been political 
prisoners), took up the cases of 25 couples (among the 100 couples who actually applied 
to marry). The association, formed by businessmen from the Tunis suburb of Manouba, 
supported these couples by furnishing their dwellings, financing the wedding ceremony, 
providing courses to prepare the couple for living together, and even continued con­
tact with them after the marriage. With the public dimension (Al-Ichhar) of marriage 
 constituting an important aspect of Islamic marriage ceremonies, and with public dis­
play also making the association’s activities more visible, the couples went from Avenue 
Habib Bourguiba in the center of Tunis to the hippodrome at Ksar Said (Manouba) in 
open carriages usually used for tourism. Then at the hippodrome, the ceremony took 
place with each couple seated on a sofa, as is done during private ceremonies. For three 
10 Sihem Badi, after having been sentenced to two years in prison in 1992 for her political activities, 
went to France where she studied medicine. Her return to Tunisia in 2011 took place in the context 
of the victory in the October 2011 elections, of a coalition that included her political party, the 
Congrès pour la République (CPR, a secularist party). Following this election, she was appointed 
Minister for Women’s Affairs. Her vision of women’s rights, marked by her experience in Europe, 
where the rights of married women or unmarried couples are protected, quickly showed its limita-
tions in the Tunisian context where her approval of orfi marriage, which allows a couple to have 
sexual relations without contravening religious dogma, was seen as putting at risk women’s rights 
and the rights of children born of such a relationship, since the orfi marriage contract was not 
legally registered and the children of such unions were not seen as legitimate (Omrane 2012; 
Meziou-Douraï 2012).
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consecutive years, 2011–2013, the Al-Afef association organized collective marriage 
 ceremonies with great fanfare.
The theatrical nature of these celebrations took place at a time when Nahdha was 
facing opposition to its notion of “complementarity” to define relations between hus­
band and wife, a notion that had been proposed by Nahdha’s Constituent Assembly 
members. Controversy over placing this notion in the new constitution, when women’s 
and human rights associations favored the term “equality”, dominated from the sum­
mer of 2012 into the year 2013, and put Nahdha on the defensive. Other events over 
the following months, such as bringing the artist Nadia Jlassi before the court for her 
installation depicting women who were being lapidated; the case of Mériem, a young 
woman raped by two policemen; the case of Amina “Femen” who put a topless self­
portrait on her Facebook page, with the inscription “My body belongs to me, it isn’t the 
honor of anyone” and who was arrested for having written “Femen” on a small wall of 
the Kairouan cemetery on the day when the salafist party Ansar Al-Shari’a was to hold 
its convention; were all widely publicized in the media and contributed to diminishing 
women’s support for the Nahdha party.
In August 2014, on the occasion of celebrations marking the 1956 promulgation of 
the Personal Status Code, Rached Ghannouchi once again took up the theme of marriage 
for unmarried older women and for divorcees, and said he was struck by the increase 
in divorces and celibacy. He called upon youth to marry women even when they were 
older, evoking the case of the Prophet Muhammad who married Khadija when she was 
in her forties.
In this context and making various calls and actions in favor of marriage for single 
women and those over the age of 30 and/or divorced – something that was viewed by 
many feminists and independent women as an intrustion into private life – Nahdha was not 
able to attain the levels of success in the November 2014 legislative elections that it had 
reached in the previous elections. To understand why Ghannouchi’s appeal did not have 
much success, we need to consider some characteristics of the “mystic­ascetic unmarried 
women” – who are unmarried not by choice, but who also do not wish to enter into a 
marriage that will lower their status or will force them to support an unemployed spouse.
4 Hijab, Fasting, and the Subversion of the Dominant 
Model of the “Moral Personality” 
Social science research in the region over recent years has shown that youth prefer 
to practice abstinence before marriage, as is the case with the group we are calling 
“mystic-ascetic unmarried women” (Ghaffari et al. 2009). Through fasting, praying, 
and wearing the hijab, the “mystic­ascetic unmarried women” demonstrate self­control 
before marriage. How far is this case of unmarried women who are kept “in­between” – 
no longer children, yet not married and full adults – relevant to the issue of the “moral 
personality”? 
Their strategy has two main components. First, by wearing the hijab, they engage in 
a form of activity that involves a sustained interplay between exposing and concealing 
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– the hijab here hides the okssa (ponytail), which has a phallic character, thus hiding 
masculinity and constituting a ritual teaching the pre­adolescent girl to restrain herself. 
In Çabra Hachma, sexualité et tradition, I showed how long hair that was not braided 
was interpreted as inviting sexual relations (Labidi 1989). Similarly, wearing the hijab 
here signifies modesty – that the individual is not ready to practice sexuality, while 
the hijab becomes a boundary/hudud that is not transgressed.11 Second, “mystic­ascetic 
unmarried women” fast to renounce all that appetite implies. Their bodies attain a kind 
of non­reproductive sexuality, a desexualization, a non­fertile look, up to and including 
a purge of femaleness – forms described in research on anorexia – but, in this context 
of women mystic­ascetics, not to the point of allowing themselves to become sick or 
to commit suicide, which would violate Islamic precepts (Qur’an 4, Sura 29, Women). 
They attribute to the fast the control of sexual impulses. This makes these women a 
particular group, where they pursue their struggle without allowing themselves to be 
engulfed by renunciation or by the pleasure of pain.
Now, if we expand our discussion to include youth in general, we can suggest that 
the submission of youth with similar characteristics (age, education, marital status) to 
religious and/or cultural precepts, supports the hypothesis that hijab, fasting, and prayer 
all play a protective role against depression (Vasegh/Mohammadi 2007: 218, 222). In 
the absence of studies on this subject in Tunisia prior to January 2011 – the Ben Ali 
regime did not permit studies that explored the Islamist milieu – studies carried out in 
other Arab or Muslim countries experiencing celibacy problems similar to those seen 
in Tunisia can be useful, even though the situation regarding women’s rights differs 
from country to country. A study carried out among 129 women and 33 men, all uni­
versity students in Kuwait with an average age of 20, shows that those who are more 
religious tend to be happier (Abdel­Khalek 2009). Another study among a group of 285 
Iranian medical students (53 percent males and 47 percent females, aged between 20 
and 31 years old with 97 percent Muslims), reported that all of the religious variables 
were found to have negative correlations with anxiety and depression scores. One of the 
reasons for this may be a result of benefits flowing from integration into a structured 
group that shares ethical norms and that allows individuals, on the psychological level, 
access to subjectivity. These studies corroborate the orientations taken by the women in 
our group, represented here by the case of Fatma, the young woman doctor mentioned 
above, who adopted certain precepts and reinterpreted them. They follow the tenets of 
their faith and share also in the rituals and rewards of Islam (Elias 1988: 209). Their 
veiling and anorexia are affirmations of a certain kind of feminism. 
This group of women, unable to accomplish the ritual of marriage and excluded 
from achieving the standard construction of the “moral personality”, constructs another 
“moral personality” model that subverts the standard. In wearing the hijab, women re­
press the symbolism of the phallic origin, and by fasting and following a code without 
compromise, the code itself is subverted. The case of these “unmarried mystic­ascetics” 
subverts the dominant notions of the “moral personality” as constructed through rites of 
passage that would otherwise keep them in a devalued status. 
11 For a discussion of how dress constitutes a language and how the dress worn by wives whose 
husbands work abroad 11 months a year – a dress worn inside out with a black belt – indicates the 
husband’s absence and the solitude of the woman’s heart, see Labidi (1980; 1989). 
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5 Conclusion
It is important to note that, starting in the 2000s, many young women with various levels 
of education were unable to fulfil their desire for dignity/karama and to realize them­
selves by finding employment and marrying a man who they believed would satisfy 
their expectations and with whom they wanted to share their lives, showing a loss of 
options available to them. This discussion has enabled us to show how the appeals for 
 karama (dignity) during the “Arab Spring” were tied to the person’s wish to control 
sexual needs and desires related to the construction of identity. We saw how unmar­
ried women, in reinterpreting notions of ethics and becoming “mystic­ascetics” before 
2011, without breaking with women’s rights as contained in the Personal Status Code, 
expressed feminist principles that the personal is also political. Focusing on this group 
of unmarried women, we see how important it is for those who cannot accomplish the 
standard rituals to find a strategy that enables them to construct a “moral personality” 
via reinterpretations and reformulating rituals, thus avoiding depression and other ab­
normal behaviors.
Has the revolution significantly changed their living condition? The economic and 
social conditions of youth continue to be extremely difficult and many still see leaving 
their country as the only solution. In this new context, “mystic­ascetic unmarried wom­
en” seek new emancipatory gender situations, certainly within an Islamic framework 
but one where the private and public spheres have become political. The significance 
of this politicization of these spheres seems to have escaped many in Tunisian society, 
with some seeing this as a return to outdated religious views and/or moral views, as in 
the effort to satisfy needs through practices such as orfi marriage and in the return to 
“honor crimes”. On the other hand, the political elites returning from exile or who spent 
considerable periods in prison, as well as those who pursued public political  activity 
during the Ben Ali period, do not seem to have fully understood the importance of 
developments related to youth – such as the difficulties of marrying, and unmarried 
women choosing a mystic­ascetic orientation – that occurred over the past two decades 
in a society increasingly open to the wider world, and leading to a cohort of youth that 
is “uninitiated” and remains marginalized. 
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